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Abstract
This paper, first published in German in Le Foucaldien 4(1) 2018 and in English 
in Le Foucaldien 6(1) 2020, explores Bruno Latour’s critique of contemporary criti-
cal theory. According to Latour, poststructuralist conceptions of critical inquiry are 
becoming increasingly outdated. In our “post-factual” era, attempting to expose facts 
as results of power-laden processes of social construction plays into the hands of an-
ti-scientific obscurantists. This is not to say, however, that one ought to opt for some 
reductionist notion of objectivity. Instead, Latour proposes a new form of critical re-
alism. While we agree with Latour about the necessity of widening our epistemo-
logical paradigm, we deem his critique of poststructuralism unfair and exaggerated. 
Moreover, we argue that he fails to account for the relationship between epistemology, 
power, and subjectivity. Since Foucault, on the other hand, succeeds where Latour 
falls short and probes into this very relationship, his is a form of critique that remains 
crucial to tackling the current crisis of truth.
1 This article was first published in Le foucaldien 6, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.16995/lefou.83. The original German 
version  "Latour, Foucault und das Postfaktische: Zur Rolle und Funktion von Kritik im Zeitalter der 'Wahrheitskrise,'" 
appeared in Le foucaldien 4, no. 1 (2018), https://doi.org/10.16995/lefou.46.
Soft Power 
Revista euro-americana de teoría e 
 historia de la política y del derecho 
Vol. 6, 2. Julio-Diciembre 2019
ISSN (online): 2539/2239 
ISSN (print): 2389-8232 
http://dx.doi.org/10.14718/SoftPower.2019.6.2.8
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   131 28/05/20   12:11
132
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
Keywords
Critique, post-factuality, post-truth politics, thing, gathering, new realism, matters 
of concern, poststructuralism, problematization, Latour, Foucault.
Resumen
Este artículo explora la crítica de Bruno Latour a la teoría crítica contemporánea. 
Según Latour, las concepciones posestructuralistas de la investigación crítica son cada 
vez más obsoletas. En nuestra era “postfactual”, intentar exponer los hechos como el 
resultado de procesos de construcción social cargados de poder acaba haciendo el juego 
de los oscurantistas anti-científicos. Sin embargo, esto no quiere decir que uno deba 
optar por una noción reduccionista de objetividad. En cambio, Latour propone una 
nueva forma de realismo crítico. Si bien estamos de acuerdo con Latour sobre la necesi-
dad de ampliar nuestro paradigma epistemológico, consideramos que su crítica al pose-
structuralismo es injusta y exagerada. Además, sostenemos que ella no tiene en cuenta 
la relación entre epistemología, poder y subjetividad. Dado que Foucault, por otro lado, 
tiene éxito donde Latour se queda corto e investiga esta relación, la suya es una forma de 
crítica que sigue siendo crucial para abordar la crisis actual de la verdad.
Palabras clave
Crítica, post-factualidad, política de la posverdad, cosa, reunión, nuevo realismo, 
asuntos de interés, posestructuralismo, problematización, Latour, Foucault.
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Introduction: The Fate of Critique in the Post-Truth Era
At the beginning of his 2012 volume Modes of Existence, Bruno Latour evokes the 
following anecdote to illustrate the social challenges we face today. During a discussion 
on climate change between French industrialists and researchers from the Collège de 
France, a professor was asked why he should be more believed than others. Tellingly, for 
Latour, the scientist did not point to data and facts, to established scientific procedures 
and universal transparency. Instead, he complained about the lack of trust in scientific 
institutions. Both the question and the answer puzzled Latour. Apparently, it no longer 
suffices to simply highlight the difference between the rationality of science and conspi-
rative irrationalism “to settle the debates over the components of the common world” 
(Latour, 2012, p.6). 
Here, Latour addresses a problem that is at the center of the current debates revolv-
ing around the term “post-truth”. If all views are judged equally valid, then scientific re-
sults lose their significance. According to the diagnosis of a post-truth era, all opinions 
seem to be on the same par, without there being a generally accepted standard by which 
to compare and evaluate them.
Latour’s analysis of the social problematization of truth and factuality dates back to 
the early 2000s. In several publications, he anticipates reflections and arguments that 
indeed come up frequently in today’s debates on post-truth politics, and he aims to offer 
an explanation of our current predicament. Latour ponders the possibility, status, and 
preconditions of social criticism, the underlying argument being that such criticism can 
no longer content itself with debunking dominant ideologies and exposing commonly 
accepted facts as social constructs. For if it did so, it would, willy-nilly, play into the 
hands of those trying to undermine facts, thereby becoming yet another cog in the ma-
chinery of “post-truth” arbitrariness that renders profound criticism impossible.
In what follows, we explore Latour’s analysis of contemporary—mostly poststruc-
turalist—forms of critique and reconstruct the alternative he provides. The form of 
critique Latour has in mind is rooted in a reconception of realism and a complex under-
standing of facticity and objectivity. We argue that Latour’s plea for a new realism based 
no longer on isolated facts but on matters of concern allows us to rethink facticity in 
a way that goes beyond positivist reductionism. In the final analysis, however, Latour’s 
claim that all contemporary forms of critical theory adhere to a naïve notion of social 
constructivism is untenable. Accordingly, and against Latour’s wholesale rejection of 
poststructuralist models of critique, we turn to Michel Foucault, whose genealogical 
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critique not only meets the criteria Latour sets for critical thinking in a purportedly 
post-truth era but also addresses questions left out in Latour’s own account. Whereas 
Latour’s new realism confines itself to broadening our epistemological perspective, Fou-
cault’s approach makes it possible to analyze epistemic quandaries by shedding light on 
their political, social, economic, and discursive conditions, without, however, reducing 
epistemology to power.
Latour’s Claim: Toward a New Realism
In his famous 2004 article “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of 
Fact to Matters of Concern,” Latour draws a gloomy picture of today’s intellectual scene. 
Investigations in the philosophy of science have repudiated all notions of objectivity. 
Given that the categories we employ and our being situated in a specific way determine 
our worldview, there seems to be no unmediated access to truth. This notion has made 
its way into public consciousness so that now science carries no more weight than the 
most far-fetched conspiracy theories:
Of course, we in the academy like to use more elevated causes—society, discourse, 
knowledge-slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism—while conspirac-
ists like to portray a miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I 
find something troublingly similar in the structure of the explanation, in the first 
movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal explanations coming 
out of the deep dark below. (Latour, 2004, 229)
When it comes to finding the culprits responsible for this unfortunate development, 
Latour is quick to point the finger at poststructuralism.2 By casting doubt on all criteria 
for scientific evidence, so Latour argues, poststructuralism draws close to conspiracy 
theories. In this regard, his text oscillates curiously between self-criticism—after all, he 
produced many important insights into how scientific knowledge is constructed (see, 
for example, Latour, 2000)—and an explicit reckoning with discourse analysis, social 
constructivism, and deconstruction. These, he holds, partake in the destruction of the 
2 Foucault, Bourdieu, and Baudrillard are mentioned by name, as are Nietzsche and Benjamin, the ancestors of French 
theory. Additionally, Latour alludes to Derrida’s deconstruction and Butler’s reflections on the social constitution of sub-
jectivity.
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critical spirit. In times of post-truth politics and fake news, arguments as to the rela-
tivity and constructedness of facts appear commonplace, and “French” social criticism 
cannot but seem an anachronistic endeavor. Insofar as poststructuralism questions the 
givenness and inalterability of facts, it is no longer able to draw a line between scientific 
findings and mere opinions. This, Latour thinks, leaves us with the task of reconsidering 
the terms of critique.
To do so, Latour examines the tools available to critical theory and tries to specify 
more clearly the initial aims of his own research. For his part, it had never been in-
tended to “get away from facts but closer to them” (Latour, 2004, p. 231). Accordingly, 
he proposes a new realism—a realism that focuses no longer on mere matters of fact 
but on matters of concern.3 This, he argues, leads not only to a sophisticated concept of 
experience but also to an ethos that protects and cherishes the world’s richness. And it 
allows us to reconfigure critique in such a way that it does not treat objects in isolation 
but respects their relationality.
In order to achieve this goal and define his notion of matters of concern, Latour 
draws on Heidegger’s late thought on the concepts of the “Thing” and the “Fourfold”. 
Thus, it is necessary that we turn to Heidegger before homing in on Latour’s own ac-
count.
Heidegger on the Given: From the “Totality of Involvements” to 
the “Fourfold”
Heidegger begins by asking how we encounter things in the world. He rejects re-
ductionist approaches to experience, trying to regain a notion of its richness and mul-
tiple facets. He shows that we do not experience things as present-at-hand objects that 
3 Latour anticipates the labels the German philosopher Markus Gabriel uses by more than a decade, both in substance and 
as regards the latter’s polemics. Like Latour, Gabriel proclaims a “new realism,” drawing heavily on Heidegger in doing so, 
and blames “postmodernism” for conjuring up the evils of relativism (see Gabriel, 2016). What is typical of the return of 
postmodernism-bashing in the German feuilleton is that its proponents usually do not deign to discuss, let alone quote, 
what thinkers such as Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, or Butler actually say. In this vein, Michael Hampe refers to the supposed 
failure of contemporary critical theory when it comes to explaining post-truth politics, without, however, offering evidence 
for his claim (see Hampe, 2016, 48). Remarkably, such different thinkers as Hampe, Gabriel, and Latour all seem to find it 
unnecessary to support their accusations with actual references to “postmodernist” or poststructuralist texts. Instead, they 
invoke the mood in academia, impressions, and what they believe to be the popular feeling. Hampe contents himself with 
a reference to the present atmosphere in “leftist cultural studies;” Gabriel settles for some Nietzschean dicta to sum up his 
hypotheses about “postmodernism;” and Latour appeals to a watered-down and popularized standard model of critique to 
make his claim about the naivety of critical theory plausible. In doing so, Hampe, Gabriel, and Latour repeat the post-truth 
gesture par excellence: They no longer refer to scientific evidence and data – such as quotable hypotheses and arguments 
– but focus on feelings and moods.
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may be used and exploited. Against such an impoverished conception of objectivity, 
Heidegger seeks to restore things in their full diversity and abundance of experiential 
possibilities by highlighting their constitutive relationality—that is, their being located 
within a web of references.
Starting with Being and Time, Heidegger criticizes the tendency to interpret all 
things in terms of an “ontology of presence-at-hand” (Vorhandenheit) that conceives 
of things as isolated objects presenting themselves readily to an equally isolated subject 
(Heidegger, 1985, p. 66-72, see also Posselt/Flatscher, 2016, pp. 180-186). According to 
Heidegger, such a view cannot do justice to our relatedness to the world—to the fact, 
that is, that our relation to the given is always already embedded in an intricate web of 
references. Think, so Heidegger suggests, of a workshop. Picking up a hammer, we do 
not first register and process sense data to then identify the object we are holding in 
our hands as a hammer. Rather, we use the hammer without hesitation to, say, knock a 
nail into the wall. We encounter the hammer as equipment (Zeug), as a tool that helps 
us accomplish a task. As such, the hammer is embedded in a „totality of involvements 
“(Heidegger, 1985, p. 115-117) that makes us understand it as something ready-to-hand. 
The hammer refers to the other tools in the workshop, to the bodily condition of its user, 
to a certain usage, to activities related to hammering, and to other possibilities, all of 
which have a specific history; it refers to its producer, to the materials it is made of, etc.4
In his later writings, Heidegger reformulates and radicalizes his reflections on the re-
lationality and historicity of objects. Starting in the mid-1940s, he draws on the Old High 
German word thing, which used to refer to a people’s assembly or trial, to suggest that the 
Ding (thing) be construed as a gathering.5 No object, Heidegger argues, simply presents 
itself to a subject. Rather, each thing assembles within itself an intricate web of relations. 
Heidegger’s prime example is that of a jug (see Heidegger, 1971a, p. 171). Since a jug is a 
man-made thing, it refers to its producer and the process of its production; moreover, 
it establishes a certain relation between the drinker and the drink (wine, as Heidegger 
has it); and it even refers to the grapevines, the fertile soil on which they throve, and 
4 “In the environment certain entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, do 
not need to be produced. Hammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they 
consist of these. In equipment that is used, ‘Nature’ is discovered along with it by that use—the ‘Nature’ we find in natural 
products.” (Heidegger, 1985, p. 100)
5 “Our language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is: thing.” (Heidegger, 1971a, p. 171) Latour 
criticizes Heidegger for establishing „a dichotomy between Gegenstand and Thing“ (Latour, 2004, p. 234), overlooking that 
Heidegger himself withdraws this distinction in his later work (along with the transcendental-horizontal conception of 
Dasein). In retrospect, it can even be shown that Heidegger’s notion of “equipment,” as he elaborates it in Being and Time, 
combines reality and relationality in the same that his conception of the thing does.
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the auspicious weather that helped them grow.6 Heidegger terms this complex web of 
relations “the fourfold” (Geviert). In each thing, the fourfold gathers together „earth and 
sky, divinities and mortals “(Heidegger, 1971a, 171)—that is, to put it in more modern 
terms, it assembles all possible references. Heidegger’s central thesis is this: Apprehending 
something always means co-apprehending something else. The complex referentiality des-
ignated by the fourfold cannot be reduced to a simple object or mere sense data but must 
be grasped as something that concerns us and that we are involved in. Here, Heidegger 
goes beyond the transcendental-horizontal approach of Being and Time (and, at least in 
his view, Husserl’s phenomenology as such). For he stops viewing the world in terms of 
Dasein’s projects, instead regarding the “mortals” —at whose plurality Heidegger hints 
without further elaborating on it—as but one of the fourfold’s poles (see also Heidegger, 
1971b). Thus, Heidegger not only puts forward a new phenomenology of the thing but 
also proposes a theory of subjectivity that runs athwart the modern understanding of 
the subject as a sovereign and transparent agent. We will come back to this aspect in our 
discussion of Foucault’s conception of a genealogical critique.
A New Concept of Facticity and a New Concept of Critique
Applying Heidegger’s reflections on the thing to the present situation, Latour brings 
to the fore the complex processes by which “mere” objects become “matters of con-
cern” and, conversely, “matters of concern” congeal into unambiguous, clearly defined 
objects. Exemplifying the former process, Latour does not, like Heidegger, turn to a 
relatively simple “object” but rather chooses a complex one—namely, the space shuttle 
Columbia—a supposedly highly accomplished, fully understood, and readily available 
object—that, while reentering the Earth’s atmosphere, broke apart and crashed in 2003. 
The events following the crash—the technical, scientific, and juridical investigations 
into its causes, the mourning discourses, and the literal collecting and gathering of the 
many pieces scattered across the land—show how “suddenly, in a stroke, an object had 
become a thing, a matter of fact was considered as a matter of great concern”:
6 In Heidegger’s “powerful vocabulary” (Latour, 2004, p. 233), this reads as follows: “the drink [Trank] abides in the whole 
gathering involved in the event of drinking [Getränk]. This gathering is the belonging-together in the event of drinking of 
what is offered and received as drinkable. The whole gathering of the drink [Getränk] consists of the drink offered [Trank] 
and the drink received [Trunk]. What is offered as drinkable is among other things wine. The one who drinks is the human. 
The whole gathering of the drink as what is offered abides in the wine, which abides in the grapevine, which abides in the 
earth and in the gifts from the sky.” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 87)
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If a thing is a gathering, as Heidegger says, how striking to see how it can sud-
denly disband. If the “thinging of the thing” is a gathering that always connects 
the ‘united four, earth and sky, divinities and mortals, in the simple onefold of 
their self-unified fourfold,’ how could there be a better example of this making 
and unmaking than this catastrophe unfolding all its thousands of folds? (Latour, 
2004, p. 235)
To exemplify the opposite process—the reduction of a matter of concern to a matter 
of fact—Latour turns to the decision of the US government to attack Iraq. The many de-
bates and reflections preceding the US campaign, Latour holds, were indeed “a Thing—
with a capital T,” but they worked toward coalescing “in one unifying, unanimous, solid, 
mastered object, masses of people, opinions, and might” (Latour, 2004, p. 235). Colin 
Powell’s notorious speech at the UN Security Council in 2003 illustrates this reduction 
perfectly. To make the case for an invasion of Iraq, Powell pulled out what seemed to be 
a vial of anthrax, thus condensing the question of war into one tiny “object”.
For Latour, both examples show that we must reject the effort of modern episte-
mology to reduce objects to mere matters of fact in favor of a new realism. This new 
realism teaches us to perceive facts and objects as “highly complex, historically situated, 
richly diverse matters of concern“ (Latour, 2004, p.237).7 As Latour sees it, contempo-
rary critique primarily focuses on the constructed character of facts, tracing them back 
to a power-laden process of social construction and thus transforming them into mere 
fairies. He wants us to know, however, that his own sociological investigations were not 
aimed at debunking facts:
The mistake would be to believe that we too have given a social explanation of 
scientific facts. No, even though it is true that at first we tried, like good critics 
trained in the good schools, to use the armaments handed to us by our betters and 
elders to crack open—one of their favorite expressions, meaning to destroy—re-
ligion, power, discourse, hegemony. But, fortunately (yes, fortunately!), one after 
the other, we witnessed that the black boxes of science remained closed and that  
7 In a similar way, but distancing himself from Heidegger, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger differentiates between “technological” 
and “scientific” objects. Although the latter depend on the former in order to appear in experimental settings, they are 
“fragile,”, remaining, as it were, in statu nascendi. Aside from drawing attention to this precarious status of epistemic ob-
jects, Rheinberger, like Latour, argues that by having their identity established, scientific objects may petrify and become 
technological objects (see Rheinberger, 1992, p. 67-82). 
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it was rather the tools that lay in the dust of our workshop, disjointed and bro-
ken. Put simply, critique was useless against objects of some solidity. (Latour, 
2004, p. 242)
Latour suggests that we go beyond the dispute between positivism and social con-
structivism. Rather than side with either the “fact position” or the “fairy position,” we 
should strive to arrive at a “fair position” (Latour 2004, p. 243)—a position, that is, that 
respects the peculiarity and autonomy of things while at the same time accounting for 
their relationality. Seeking support for this new approach, Latour can no longer refer 
to Heidegger, who, he holds, reaches an impasse when he indulges his hostility toward 
science. Instead, and rather surprisingly, Latour turns to Alfred Whitehead. Whitehead, 
Latour claims, has furnished us Çwith a complex understanding of nature and objec-
tivity. In his Tanner lectures The Concept of Nature, for instance, Whitehead refuses 
to confine himself to analyzing but a limited set of paradigmatic natural objects and 
instead urges us to consider the complexity of our engagement with the things that 
affect us: “For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the 
molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomenon.” 
(Whitehead, 1995, p. 20) According to Latour, this practice of gathering together and 
assembling the ways in which we approach phenomena provides us with a standard 
by which critique can operate: “The critic is not the one who debunks”—that is, the 
one who reduces the given to the social conditions of its construction— “but the one 
who assembles.” (Latour, 2004, p.246) The “assembling” or “gathering” critic analyzes, 
and preserves, the referential web of relations that make a thing a thing. Critique thus 
becomes a cautious care for the fragile, requiring that we bring into relief the multidi-
mensionality of the gathered.
A Gathering Epistemology as a New Form of Critique?
Latour does not bother to verify his accusations against poststructuralist models of 
critique by, say, quoting from texts that would actually try to debunk facts and expose 
them as mere fairies (see above note 2). Instead, he repeats the very gesture he takes 
issue with, reducing a complex and conflictual field (the “assembly” of contemporary 
models of critique) to a seemingly unambiguous and clearly defined “object”. By mis-
representing the plethora of critical theories as a single failed project, Latour strays from 
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the path that he thinks a critical analysis must follow. In short, in his critique of critique, 
Latour is not a gathering but a debunking critic.
On top of that, Latour’s rhetoric is deeply disturbing. Not only does he employ a bel-
ligerent vocabulary, evoking scenes of combat, weaponry, generals, strategies, etc.,8 but 
he also produces obscurities that elude the reader. For instance, he accuses traditional 
critique of “fight[ing] the wrong enemies” and of having been “considered as friends by 
the wrong sort of allies” (Latour, 2004, p.231) without further specifying what he means. 
These and other obscurities add a conspirative note to his text.
What is more, Latour’s claim about poststructuralism unwittingly forming an al-
liance with post-truth strategies that seek to undermine scientific facts does not bear 
scrutiny. True, if one trawls through online forums of climate change deniers or visits 
websites promulgating the idea of intelligent design, one will, indeed, find an occasional 
reference to “postmodernism” as a potential ally in the effort to defend anti-evolution-
ary religious propaganda,9 as well as harsh denials of any such affinities on the part of 
the “creationists” (see e.g. Reynolds, 2010). The great majority of these publications, 
however, do not draw on “postmodernist” concepts but rather resort to scientific pos-
itivism to make their claims. In this vein, “religious” or “skeptical” deniers of climate 
change or evolutionary biology continuously point out either that these theories are 
not falsifiable and therefore unscientific (see e.g. already Morris, 1974) or that they are 
“mere theories”10 and thus “falsifiable” and possibly wrong.11 From this it follows that, 
against what those riding the bandwagon of postmodernism-bashing might believe, the 
involuntary godfather of post-truth obscurantism is Popper, not Lyotard.12
8 “Of course conspiracy theories are an absurd deformation of our own arguments, but, like weapons smuggled through a 
fuzzy border to the wrong party, these are our weapons nonetheless. In spite of all the deformations, it is easy to recognize, 
still burnt in the steel, our trademark: Made in Criticalland. Do you see why I am worried? Threats might have changed so 
much that we might still be directing all our arsenal east or west while the enemy has now moved to a very different place. 
After all, masses of atomic missiles are transformed into a huge pile of junk once the question becomes how to defend 
against militants armed with box cutters or dirty bombs. Why would it not be the same with our critical arsenal, with the 
neutron bombs of deconstruction, with the missiles of discourse analysis?” (Latour, 2004, p. 230)
9 For a collection of some references, see Robert Pennock (2010). He shows that, for the most part, it was but a single 
prominent proponent of the creationist movement that referred to “postmodernism”.
10 Laurence Moran deals with these accusations; see Moran, 1993. 
11 There is, especially as regards climate change denial, a third, particularly inane “skeptical” position—one that is based 
on a blinkered, naïve realism à la “It’s freezing cold outside—and these eggheads talk about global warming!” One of the 
most prominent proponents of this position is Donald Trump, the President of the United States. In 2007 he twittered the 
following: “In the East, it could be the COLDEST New Year’s Eve on record. Perhaps we could use a little bit of that good 
old Global Warming that our Country, but not other countries, was going to pay TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS to protect 
against. Bundle up!” (28.12.2017)
12 The Wikipedia article “Objections to Evolution” illustrates this perfectly. While it reconstructs and refutes pseudo-fal-
sificationist and pseudo-positivist positions, the article makes no mention of objections inspired by “postmodernism.” 
Note, however, that we do not want to claim that there is some unacknowledged affinity between positivism and post-truth 
obscurantism. The reason why climate change deniers and their kind resort to the parlance of scientific positivism is that it 
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Latour’s weaker claim of a mere “structural analogy” between poststructuralist cri-
tique and conspirative-obscurantist positions (without identifiable interaction) derives 
its plausibility from being predicated on a watered-down, popularized version of post-
structuralism. If, however, we direct our gaze toward thinkers such as Foucault, Ly-
otard, Derrida, or Butler, we will not only find ideas and arguments that Latour, without 
noting it, uses for his own account13 but also come across tools that help us analyze the 
present predicament.14
To substantiate this claim, let us, first, zoom in on Latour’s exclusive focus on 
epistemology.15 As we have seen, Latour dismisses the reductionist epistemological 
paradigm that construes the epistemic subject and its object as isolated entities in 
favor of a much more complex concept of object-relatedness. The main problem with 
the reductionist view, Latour argues, is its notion of mere facts, because it leads to 
an ill-conceived understanding of experience: “matters of fact are a poor proxy of 
experience and of experimentation” and “a confusing bundle of polemics, of episte-
mology, of modernist politics that can in no way claim to represent what is requested 
by a realist attitude” (Latour, 2004, p.52).16 Latour’s gathering realism, on the other 
hand, knows what the proponents of reductionist empiricism ignore—namely, that 
the given presupposes a web of relations and cannot be understood in isolation of its 
relationality. For the project of a new critique, this means that it has to defend these 
relational entities against reductionism, constructivism, and obscurantism. Accord-
ingly, if we were to respond to climate change deniers, we would neither (like the 
reductionist) refer to isolated facts and data nor (like the constructivist) try to expose 
dominates the academic discourse of our times. In other words, they would be ill-advised if they tried to justify their claims 
by drawing on what are but marginalized positions within academia.
13 Judith Butler, for instance, responds to critics of Gender Trouble (1990) who accuse her of proposing an implausible ver-
sion of social constructivism by advancing, in Bodies that Matter (1993), a theory of bodily materiality and materialization 
that aims at analyzing the processes by which human bodies are constituted as bodies that matter—that is, as matters of 
concern. In this sense, Butler anticipates Latour’s change of focus from matters of fact to matters of concern.
14 Here, we can also turn to Donna Haraway’s feminist epistemology. With her concept of “situated knowledges,” Haraway 
anticipates both Latour’s claim that we ought to realign critical theory and his plea for a new, non-reductionist concept 
of experience. Haraway argues that “it is not enough to show radical historical contingency and modes of construction 
for everything.” Rather, a feminist epistemology must engage with standard science in order to gain “enforceable, reliable 
accounts of things not reducible to power moves and agonistic, high status games of rhetoric or to scientistic, positivist 
arrogance” (Haraway, 1991, p. 187-188). Her concept of situated knowledge highlights that knowledge is constitutively 
embodied. As such, it involves a concrete positioning and ethico-political responsibility. Latour ignores these aspects. 
15 Dagmar Comtesse presented a similar argument in her IPW-lecture “Fake News und Kontingenzdenken. Für Machta-
nalyse statt Wahrheitsglauben” (University of Vienna, 19.4.2018), helping us to clarify our own position. 
16 In light of this passage, Latour’s position could also be interpreted as a normative reversal of what he takes to be the do-
minant version of contemporary critique. For as these lines make clear, Latour shares the view that the given is constituted 
within (social and political) relations. What he rejects, though, is the normative evaluation that accompanies this position.
Matthias Flatscher & Sergej Seitz  LATOUR, FOUCAULT, AND POST-TRUTH: THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CRITIQUE 
IN THE ERA OF THE TRUTH CRISIS
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   141 28/05/20   12:11
142
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
the fabricated nature of all factual positions; as gathering critics, we would, rather, 
make explicit the complex scientific, historical, ethical, and social processes of assem-
bly that are necessary for an “object” such as climate change to come into existence 
and be recognized as such. Drawing on Heidegger’s parlance, the position of the critic 
would thus be that of a “shepherd of being”. 
What is missing in this picture is the institutional framework in which the gathering 
of relations and the preservation of diverse approaches are supposed to come into play. 
When Latour conjures up the possibility of “a multifarious inquiry launched with the 
tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how many 
participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its existence” (La-
tour, 2004, p. 246), he seems to assume that all problems disappear as soon as a large 
number of disciplines have their say. It is not clear, however, how such a multifarious 
inquiry may help us solve concrete problems such as climate change denial (not to men-
tion the fact that a number of disciplines already work together). Even more troubling 
is that, in the final analysis, Latour’s gathering critique amounts to scientific pedagogy. 
Indeed, Latour seems to think that it suffices to explain to climate change deniers how 
it came that we accept climate change as real (that is, what had to be gathered) in order 
for them to renounce their skepticism.
Latour fails to take into consideration the strategic, economic, and political inter-
ests that play into post-truth obscurantism, or, for that matter, climate change denial. 
Indeed, he restricts himself to offering an expanded and transformed epistemology—
from matters of fact to matters of concern—and a new concept of objectivity—from 
the object to the thing-as-gathering. He does not, however, explicate the relation this 
expanded notion of epistemology bears to the spheres of social power, economy and 
politics. In fact, Latour hardly ever addresses the question of power—and when he does, 
he uses mostly dismissive and negative terms. Contrary to what Latour seems to think, 
pondering the relation of power and knowledge does not in any way mean conflating 
the two. In other words: Why should power relations not play a role in the gathering 
that makes a thing a thing? There has been no one more meticulous in the study of the 
complex relationship between knowledge and the formation of truth, social power, and 
subjectivity than Michel Foucault, who argues that these factors are constitutive of, but 
not reducible to, one another. Therefore, it is to him that we now turn in order to address 
the lacuna in Latour’s reflections—that is, the question of power.
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Between Truth, Power, and Subjectivity: Back to Foucault
In our attempt to evaluate Foucault’s reflections on critique in terms of Latour’s crite-
ria for critical thinking, we do not, as one might expect, draw on Foucault’s more popu-
lar and oft-quoted ponderings on critique (see Foucault, 1997). Instead, we concentrate 
on two strands in the intricate fabric of his oeuvre that respond directly to the challenges 
Latour sets. There are two steps to our argument. First, we focus on Foucault’s reflections 
on the complex of knowledge and power, to which Latour refers rather contemptuously 
in “Why has Critique Run out of Steam?” In the 1970s Foucault analyzes the paradigm 
shift in epistemology from “inquiry” (enquête) to “examination” (epreuve). In doing 
so, he goes beyond traditional epistemology, taking into consideration the question of 
power via an analysis of the discursive transformations that accompany the rise of cap-
italism, civil law, and the Humanities and in which economic, political, and juridical 
aspects come into play against an institutional background (Foucault, 2002). Second, 
we draw on Foucault’s late lectures on the antique concept of parrhesia or truth-telling. 
Here, Foucault not only analyzes the interrelation between truth, power, and subjec-
tivity but also examines a specific “truth crisis” that hit Greek antiquity (see Gehring/
Gelhard, 2012, Posselt/Seitz, 2018).
Foucault describes the decisive shift from the paradigm of inquiry to that of exam-
ination along the following lines: Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, several 
transformations have caused the decline of inquiry as the primary means to acquire 
knowledge. The procedure of inquiry, originating in juridical practice and well-estab-
lished since antiquity, aims at reconstructing an event by interrogating witnesses and 
gathering evidence. In modernity, the method of inquiry morphs into “panopticism.” 
Now, a multitude of different institutions—schools, factories, mental hospitals, prisons, 
etc.—surveil, control, and normalize subjects in order to gather knowledge. In his 1973 
lecture Truth and Juridical Forms, Foucault describes this as follows: 
It was no longer a matter of reconstituting an event, but something—or, rather, 
someone—who needed total, uninterrupted supervision. A constant supervision 
of individuals by someone who exercised a power over them—schoolteacher, 
foreman, physician, psychiatrist, prison warden—and who, so long as he exer-
cised power, had the possibility of both supervising and constituting a knowl-
edge concerning those he supervised. A knowledge that now was no longer about  
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determining whether or not something had occurred; rather, it was about whether 
an individual was behaving as he should, in accordance with the rule or not, and 
whether he was progressing or not. (Foucault, 2002, p. 59)
As this passage makes clear, the shift away from matters of fact—the primary con-
cern of the method of inquiry—occurs two hundred years earlier than Latour thinks. 
Additionally, Foucault traces inquiry’s origins back to Greek antiquity and the investi-
gation into the regicide in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex (see Foucault, 2008). Unlike Latour, 
Foucault carries out a discursive and genealogical analysis of the practices that aim at 
gathering and assembling knowledge. He probes into the compulsory urge to control 
implicit in these practices of examination by turning to the institutions that play a fun-
damental role in what he terms the “disciplinary society,” whose mechanisms, along 
with panopticism, still affect how we live. Here, thinking about the constitution of the 
subject always entails contemplating a history of power. According to Foucault, knowl-
edge refers not only to natural or produced objects but to human beings—a fact that 
Latour merely alludes to in his object-oriented conception. Importantly, the control of 
human beings also plays into the hands of capitalism. When wealth ceases to be defined 
primarily in terms of landownership and money and instead is understood in terms of 
movable forms of capital, such as resources, commodities, and machinery, that require 
protection from thieves and looters, new instruments of control have to be invented. 
In this context, surveillance should not only respond to crimes already committed but 
rather forestall possible offences.
Foucault shows how these apparatuses of control combine prototypes of state and 
non-state coercion, and he elaborates on how this combination manifests itself in 
a variety of institutions, ranging from schools to factories and barracks to mental 
hospitals and prisons. Starting in the nineteenth century, these institutions exercise 
more and more control, handing over the subjects individualized by the disciplinary 
apparatus to work, keeping them under constant surveillance and even checking on 
their bodies: 
[I]f one closely analyzes the reasons for which individuals’ entire existence was 
controlled by these institutions, one sees that, at bottom, it was not just a matter of 
appropriating, extracting the maximum quantity of time but also of controlling, 
shaping, valorizing the individual’s body according to a particular system. (Fou-
cault, 2002, p. 82)
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These institutions represent a new kind of power that can be neither identified with 
sovereignty nor traced back to the state or a specific class. Rather, it is a polymorphous 
power that sustains the capitalist system and the bourgeois legal order (Foucault, 2008). 
What Foucault seems to have in mind is a complicated fabric made up of many strands: 
economic aspects of production, political aspects of inclusion and exclusion, juridical 
aspects, and the epistemic claim to knowledge.
It is important to note that Foucault’s reflections on power and knowledge are pred-
icated on his not reducing the latter to the former. Otherwise he would lose sight of 
the specifics of the various practices of knowledge he analyzes. Although—or, rather, 
because—power and knowledge are not the same, probing into forms of knowledge, so 
Foucault argues, requires that we reflect on their power-laden social and political con-
ditions. By the same token, we should be aware of the fact that the practices of gathering 
and assembling (knowledge) have a complex and dark history—a history that Latour’s 
presentist conception of gathering largely neglects.17 As should have become clear by 
now, Latour misses the point when he concedes that Foucault’s historical investigations 
are more complex and subtler than conspiracy theories. For, in fact, Foucault’s reflec-
tions have nothing in common with them. Whereas conspiracy theories assume that so-
cial phenomena have a simple and identifiable origin, a doer behind the deed, Foucault 
vehemently rejects all explanatory models of this type.
In his late lectures in Berkeley and at the Collège de France, Foucault reframes and 
radicalizes the notion that the investigation of experience must focus on epistemic prac-
tices, forms of power, and modes of subjectivation, without, however, losing sight of 
their irreducibility to one another. To do so, he turns to the ancient practice of parrhesia, 
a form of truth-telling that is not regulated by institutions. As Foucault points out, it is 
when the polis faces an institutional crisis that parrhesia becomes a topic to be debat-
ed in philosophical, ethical, and political discussions. Here, what Foucault terms prob-
lematization plays a decisive role. Foucault uses this concept to addresses the historical 
processes by which objects and practices—in the case of parrhesia, a certain mode of 
veridiction—that have been accepted as unproblematic givens turn into focal points for 
experience and epistemic, ethical, and political debates:
The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of expe-
rience, or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which were 
17 As for the figure of the critic that Latour proposes—the critic as an innocent and caring shepherd of the gathering of 
knowledge—one may also think of Foucault’s analyses of the pastorate and pastoral power (see Foucault 1982).
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familiar and ‘silent,’ out of discussion) becomes a problem, raises discussion and 
debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, 
habits, practices, and institutions. The history of thought, understood in this way, 
is the history of the way people begin to take care of something, of the way they 
become anxious about this or that—for example, about madness, about crime, 
about sex, about themselves, or about truth. (Foucault, 2001, p. 74)
By drawing his attention to problematizations, Foucault does not mean to merely 
analyze purported facts and locate them in the course of history; nor does he subscribe 
to the view that phenomena such as sexuality, crime, madness, and truth are but so-
cial constructs. Rather, Foucault wants to find out why and how something becomes 
a (scientific, ethical, and political) problem. In this sense, Foucault anticipates Latour’s 
analysis of the shift from matters of fact to matters of concern, matters of concern being 
things that people care about—that is, complex realities embedded in heterogeneous 
discourses, institutions, and apparatuses within a specific historical constellation. Cru-
cially, and contrary to what Latour claims, Foucault does not deny the reality of the 
objects he analyzes: 
[W]hen I say that I am studying the ‘problematization’ of madness, crime, or sex-
uality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, 
I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which 
was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this 
one: how and why were very different things in the world gathered together, char-
acterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, ‘mental illness’? What are the 
elements which are relevant for a given ‘problematization’? And even if I won’t say 
that what is characterized as ‘schizophrenia’ corresponds to something real in the 
world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a relation between 
the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The prob-
lematization is an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real. (Foucault, 2001, 
pp. 171-172)
To sum up, to investigate problematizations is to investigate the paradigmatic mat-
ters of concern of a given historical epoch. In this sense, Foucault’s approach does 
indeed, as Latour thinks critical theory should, get “closer” to reality—closer, that is, 
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than positivist positions, which revolve around an impoverished concept of facts or 
data, and constructivist positions, which think of reality as a mere effect of power re-
lations. Only if we untangle the intricate web of epistemology, power, and subjectiva-
tion, may we understand a “Thing” such as parrhesia—or, for that matter, the present 
“crisis of truth.” Accordingly, the (epistemic) “analysis of forms of veridiction” must 
be combined with the (political and discursive) “analysis of procedures of govern-
mentality” and the (subject-oriented) “analysis of the pragmatics of self ” (Foucault, 
2010, p.5).18
Conclusion
The above should have made clear that, on the whole, we agree with Latour’s diagno-
sis of the present. On top of that, we have argued for a thorough analysis of post-truth 
obscurantism. Like Latour, we are concerned about there not being a proper under-
standing of experience, and we think that this problem has to do with the positivistic 
reduction of experience to mere facts or data. In this sense, it is symptomatic that today 
we bemoan the alleged loss of all facts when, in fact, there is a strong possibility of us 
being soon ruled by algorithmic regimes—regimes that aim at the calculability of all be-
havior and in which matters of concern only matter insofar as they can be commodified 
and used as data sets, the zero-grade version of matters of fact.19
In light of the current problematization of truth, factuality, and objectivity, it 
would be mistaken to think of Foucault’s reflections as being obsolete. In fact, if we 
are to tackle our current predicament, in which what is at stake is precisely the intri-
cate entanglement of truth, power, and subjectivity, we must consider this very triad 
18 In the epilog to Foucault’s lecture The Courage of the Truth, Frédéric Gros emphasizes the necessity of considering all 
three perspectives without reducing them to one another: “The three dimensions of Knowledge, Power, and the Subject (or 
rather, of veridiction, governmentality, and subjectivation) […] are not like three distinct parts to be studied in turn, like 
three separate domains. Foucault insists on the idea that the identity of the discourse of philosophy since its Socratic-Plato-
nic foundation consists precisely in a structure of reciprocal correlation: never studying discourses of truth without at the 
same time describing their effect on the government of self and others; never analyzing structures of power without at the 
same time showing the knowledge and forms of subjectivation they rely on; never identifying modes of subjectivation wi-
thout including their political extensions and the relations they have to the truth. And we should not hope for one of these 
dimensions to be consecrated as the fundamental dimension: political violence or moral postures will never disappear in a 
general logic; the demands of knowledge or ethical constructions will never be reduced to forms of domination; and finally, 
it will never be possible to found forms of veridiction and modes of government on subjective structures.” (Gros, CT, 346)
19 One could argue that the machine-aided process of abstracting experience does not even come to halt at the level of 
mere data but, instead, goes on to reduce these data to metadata. 
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with respect to its genealogy. Rather than repeat Latour’s gesture and jettison all the 
tools that critical theory offers, we should focus on the gist of his argument and switch 
from debunking to gathering: As for critique, this would mean reassembling its many 
complex and contradictory facets. Accordingly, critique itself would have to become a 
matter of concern in order for it to again shatter ossified positions and analyze trou-
blesome developments.20
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Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hampe, M. (2016). Katerstimmung bei den pubertären Theoretikern. Die Zeit 
19.12.2016, 48.
Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. The Reinvention of Nature. New 
York: Routledge.
Heidegger, M. (1971a). The Thing. In Poetry, Language, Thought. pp. 161-184. New 
York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1971b). Building Dwelling Thinking. In Poetry, Language, Thought. pp. 
141-160. New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1985). Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Heidegger, M. (2010). Country Path Conversations. Bloomington: Indiana UP. 
Latour, B. (2000). Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard UP.
Latour, B. (2004). Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters 
of Concern. Critical Inquiry 30, pp. 225-248.
Latour, B. (2012). An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. An Anthropology of the Moderns. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.
Moran, L. (1993). Evolution is a Fact and a Theory. The TalkOrigins Archive. Exploring 
the Creation/Evolution Controversy, 22.1.1993, http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/evo-
lution-fact.html.
Morris, H. M. (Ed.) (1974. Scientific Creationism. Prepared by the technical staff and con-
sultants of the Institute for Creation Research. San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers.
Pennock, R. (2010). The Postmodern Sin of Intelligent Design Creationism. Science & 
Education, 19, 6-8, June 2010, pp. 757-778.
Posselt, G. & M. Flatscher (2016). Sprachphilosophie. Eine Einführung. Vienna: facultas/
UTB.
Posselt, G. & S. Seitz (2018). Sprachen des Widerstands. Zur Normativität politischer 
Artikulation bei Foucault und Rancière. In O. Marchart & R. Martinsen (Eds.), Fou-
cault und das Politische. Transdisziplinäre Impulse für die politische Theorie der Geg-
enwart. Wiesbaden: Springer.
Reynolds, J. M. (2010) On Creation and Post-Modernism. First Things, 18.32010, 
https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2010/03/on-creation-and-post-
modernism.
Matthias Flatscher & Sergej Seitz  LATOUR, FOUCAULT, AND POST-TRUTH: THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CRITIQUE 
IN THE ERA OF THE TRUTH CRISIS
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   149 28/05/20   12:11
150
Soft Power          Volumen 6, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2019
Rheinberger, H.J. (1992). Experiment, Differenz, Schrift. Zur Geschichte epistemischer 
Dinge. Marburg an der Lahn: Basilisken-Presse.
Whitehead, A. N. (1995). The Concept of Nature. The Tanner Lectures Delivered in Trin-
ity College November 1919. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Wikipedia. Objections to evolution. Last revised 3.5.2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Objections_to_evolution.
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   150 28/05/20   12:11
